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Abstract 
This thesis examines several aspects of the legal process that noncitizens confront while they 
navigate their way through the U.S. immigration courts. It begins with the structure of 
immigration courts including various sectors under the United States Department of Justice, 
which houses the Executive Office of Immigration Review and other administrative offices. 
Additionally, the processes performed in immigration courts (i.e. Master Calendar Hearings and 
Individual Hearings) are discussed. Subsequently, an exploration of the increase in backlogged 
immigration cases and the increase of the money being allocated to the Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection is included. Compared to these 
Department of Homeland Security enforcement sectors, there is a relative lack of funding for 
immigration courts. Given this, an assessment of the immigration courts' current problems, 
including lack of funding as well as the understaffing and retention of qualified immigration 
judges, is undertaken. Finally, the impact of these problems on immigrants, such as time spent in 
detention centers and potential solutions for addressing these problems are presented. 
Keywords: immigration courts, immigration judges (!Js), immigration court proceedings, 
immigration court backlog 
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hnmigration Courts: 
Processes, Problems and Prescriptions for Improvement 
Introduction 
Precisely one court date stands in between thirty four year old Maximiano Vazquez­
Guevarra and his designation as a legal permanent resident in the United States. Vazquez left the 
Mexican state of Guanajuato and entered the U.S. illegally in 1998. Ever since 2011, when he 
grabbed authorities' attention after his second driving-under-the-influence charge, he has been 
fighting deportation. In 2015, Vazquez won his appeal to remain in the U.S.; however, his case 
must be presented to an immigration judge one last time. While his case was once on the docket, 
it has since been pulled (Lofholm, 2015). 
Similarly, Ricardo Perez Luna's hearing in the Los Angeles hnmigration Court was 
cancelled in January 2015. Perez, a Mexico native, originally had a January 28 hearing date 
where a judge was to grant him permanent residence. Perez entered the U.S. in 2002 without 
papers and has invested more than $22,000 in legal fees to gain permanent residency. Now, he 
could possibly have to wait until 2019 to receive his hearing. According to his attorney, 
Fernando Romo, Perez's case was an example of damage stemming from the congestion within 
immigration courts: "It was a mere formality-my client had complied with all the requisites and 
only needed the judge's approval. Ten minutes, that's all we needed" ("Frustration of 
undocumented immigrants grows as U.S. courts cancel hearings", 2015). 
Seven minutes. That's all the time Mario Iraheta's hearing was given in Arlington, 
Virginia. On a February 2014 morning, Judge Lawrence Burman's docket overflowed-he 
needed to make 26 complicated decisions by lunch, one of which was lraheta's bond hearing. 
Therefore, Ricky Malik, Iraheta's lawyer, only had seven minutes to present the 36-year-old's 
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case. Malik stood in front of the judge, but Iraheta did not; he was not physically in Arlington 
and attended his hearing via video feed from a detention center in Fannville, Virginia. Although 
he was in Fannville, Iraheta's wife, Maria, and two of his three children watched him on the 
television screen in the court room (Saslow, 2014). 
In 2000, Iraheta illegally entered the United States from El Salvador and a year later, 
Maria joined her husband. Iraheta began working in construction while Maria ''walked two miles 
each evening to wash dishes at IHOP for $8 an hour." Over a span of 14 years in the United 
States, the couple joined a church, paid taxes, and raised three children now ages 19, 15 and 9 
(Saslow, 2014). 
The Iraheta's journey towards the American Dream came to an immediate halt when 
Iraheta was detained while driving to his sister's house for a Sunday barbeque. Unfortunately, 
this was not his first run in with the law; two misdemeanor property damage charges, of less than 
$1,000, from 2003 and 2004 were on his record. Now, Judge Burman was charged with the task 
of determining if Iraheta' s crimes were indications of poor character, which is referred to ''moral 
turpitude" by the law. If Burman were to rule that moral turpitude was committed, Iraheta would 
be denied bail and would also be deported back to El Salvador (Saslow, 2014). 
Iraheta fervently pleaded his case to Burman. But unfortunately, it wasn't enough. In 
seven minutes, Burman denied Iraheta's bond, which was accompanied with one short phrase: 
"We are out of time" (Saslow, 2014). 
Vazquez, Perez's, and Iraheta's hearings are examples of 445,000 cases that make up the 
national immigration court jam (Hennessey-Fiske, 2015). With an excessive number of cases on 
their docket and minimal funding provided to their courtrooms, immigration judges (Us) are 
severely oveiworked, which has led to an increase in stress and decline in the profession's 
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retention rate. As a result, cases are not being detennined in a timely manner and, subsequently, 
a plethora of undocumented immigrants are being held in detention centers. 
The Structure 
Currently, there are 57 immigration courts located across the country (Saslow, 2014). 
These courts are located in various cities within 28 states and territories: Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, and Washington (The United States Department of Justice, 2016). Texas has the most 
immigration courts out of the 28 states. As shown in Figure 1, in most Texas cities that house 
immigration courts, there has been a substantial surge in cases filed between Fiscal Year {FY) 
2013 and FY 2014. For example, in FY 2013, the court in Houston received 6,382 cases. That 
number skyrocketed to 14, 363 in FY 2014, which is a 125% increase {"FY 2014 Statistics 
Yearbook, 2015). 
[Figure 1 here] 
In order to properly understand how the immigration courts, such as the one in Houston 
function, it is necessary to examine the structure of immigration courts and their related sectors. 
Office of the Director 
Immigration courts are housed within the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(EOIR), which is a committee that functions within the Department of Justice (Legomsky, 2010, 
p. 1641). Essentially, the EOIR serves as an umbrella for numerous sectors that fall underneath 
it. At the top of the EOIR chain is the Director who is responsible for representing "the position 
and policies ofEOIR to the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Members of Congress, 
.. 
IMMIGRATION COURTS 6 
and other governmental bodies, the news media, the bar, and private groups interested in 
immigration matters" (The United States Department of Justice, 2015). The Deputy Director, 
who works directly under the Director, "oversees the Board of Immigration Appeals, Office of 
the Chief Immigration Judge, and Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer'' (The 
United States Department of Justice, 2015). Additionally, the Deputy presides over the "EOIR's 
Office of the General Counsel, Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, Office of Legal 
Access Programs (which includes EOIR's Legal Orientation and Pro Bono Program), and the 
Offices of Management Programs, Planning, Analysis and Technology, and the Office of 
Administration" (The United States Department of Justice, 2015). 
(Figure 2 here] 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
The highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration laws is the 
Board of Immigration Appeals {BIA). BIA is authorized to have up to 15 Board Members, which 
include a Chairmen and Vice Chairman who share the responsibility for BIA management. 
Located at EOIR headquarters in Falls Church, Virginia, the BIA does not hear courtroom 
proceedings but instead rules on appeals based on the "paper review of cases." However, on rare 
occasions, the BIA does hear oral arguments of appealed cases at the headquarters. Overall, the 
BIA has nationwide jurisdiction to reconsider certain rulings made by IJs and "district directors 
of the Department of Homeland Security {DHS) in a wide variety of proceedings in which the 
Government of the United States is one party and the other party is an alien, a citizen, or a 
business firm" (The United States Department of Justice, 2015). 
I 
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Office of the Chief Immigration Judge 
The Us who preside over each of the 28 courts are considered to be a part of the Office of 
the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ) (Legomsky, 2010, p. 1641). However, the OCIJ "is led by 
the chief operating judge, who establishes operating policies and oversees policy implementation 
for the immigration courts" (The United States Department of Justice, 2016). Additionally, the 
OCIJ "establishes priorities for approximately 250 immigration judges . . .  "(The United States 
Department of Justice, 2016). 
According to Legomsky (2010), the attorney general appoints immigration judges and 
members of the BIA. "All of those adjudicators are "Schedule A" (career) appointees, as 
distinguished from "Schedule C" (political) appointees" (Legomsky, 2010, p. 1665). Policies 
stemming from both federal law and the Justice Department prohibit hiring discrimination in 
relation to partisan beliefs (Legomsky, 2010, p. 1665). Until the spring 2004, this non­
discrimination policy was honored, and the EOIR was primarily responsible for handling the 
hiring of IJs (OIG Special Report, 2008). When an IJ position became available, either via 
retirement or the creation of a new position, the EIOR "posted a vacancy announcement 
identifying the location of the vacancy, the minimum requirements for applicants, and a 
statement that the Department is an Equal Opportunity Employer that does not discriminate on 
the basis of, among other things, "politics"' (OIG Special Report, 2008). However, as a result of 
a joint investigation conducted by both the Justice Department's Office of Professional 
Responsibility and the Office of the Inspector General, it was determined that between 2004 and 
2006 ''high officials from the White House and the Department of Justice had bypassed the usual 
application procedures to appoint immigration judges based on their Republican Party 
affiliations or their conservative political views" (Legomsky, 2010, p.1666). In 2007, a new IJ 
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appointment process, which re-instituted the role of the EOIR, was implemented by the attorney 
general (Legomsky, 2010, p. 1666). 
Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer 
"The Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO) is headed by a Chief 
Administrative Hearing Officer who is responsible for the general supervision and management 
of Administrative Law Judges" (The United States Department of Justice, 2016). These 
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) preside over hearings that are mandated by law requirements 
that were enacted by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) and the 
Immigration Act of 1990. These acts, in conjunction with others, modified the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) (The United States Department of Justice, 2016). AUs hear 
cases and rule on issues pertaining to provisions found in the INA such as: (1) "knowingly 
hiring, recruiting, or referring for a fee unauthorized aliens, or the continued employment of 
unauthorized aliens .. .  [etc.]"; (2) "immigration-related unfair employment practices in violation 
of section 2748 of the INA"; and (3) immigration-related document fraud in violation of274C of 
the INA" (The United States Department of Justice, 2016). 
Office of the General Counsel 
This particular branch of the EOIR is responsible for providing legal advice pertaining to 
matters that involve the EOIR and its employees in regards to their official duties. The Office of 
the General Counsel (OGC) "staff coordinates the development of agency regulations, reviews 
and comments on proposed legislation, and responds to all Freedom of Information and Privacy 
Act requests;' (The United States Department of Justice, 2015). Additionally, the OGC serves as 
the reference point for Standards of Conduct and other ethical matters in relation to EOIR 
employees (The United States Department of Justice, 2015). 
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Office of Administration 
The Office of Administration oversees the actions of the Controller (Budget and 
Financial Management), Human Resources and Contracts and Procurement. As a collective 
team, the Office of Administration works to "ensure coordination" among the office's staff while 
engaging with each EOIR customer (The United States Department of Justice, 2015). 
Office of Management Programs 
"The Office of Management Programs (OMP) is responsible for several special emphasis 
and compliance programs, including Security, Legislative and Public Affairs, and Space and 
Facilities Management" (The United States Department of Justice, 2015). Additionally, in 
response to the Director of the EIOR, the DOJ, the White House as well as other government 
entities, the OMP monitors the planning and development of activities related management 
proposals (The United States Department of Justice, 2015). 
Office of Planning, Analysis, & Technology 
"The Office of Planning, Analysis, and Technology (OPAT) conducts EOIR's strategic 
and long-range planning, as well as maintains a focus on the outcome of such planning through 
monitoring the agency's annual performance plans" (The United States Department of Justice, 
2015). OP AT is also charged with the tasks of producing program analysis, statistical reports, 
and reporting on EOIR's senior management's mission centric goals and objectives (The United 
States Department of Justice, 2015). 
The Process 
When the fate of immigrants, such as Vazquez, Perez, and Iraheta, in the United States is 
at hand, removal proceedings are likely to occur. These proceedings determine whether 
undocumented citizens should be deported from the United States (Legomsky, 2010, p. 1641). 
I I 
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Removal proceedings are initiated when the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issues a 
''Notice to Appear' (NTA) to noncitizens whom they wish to remove from the country 
(Legomsky, 2010, p. 1641). The NTA includes charges that generally look like the following (as 
stated in the Immigration Equality Asylum Manual): 
• You are not a citizen or national of the United States; 
• You are a native of Egypt and a citizen of Egypt; 
• You were admitted to the United States at New York, NY on December 13, 2004 as a 
nonimmigrant B-2 with authorization to remain in the United States for a temporary 
period not to exceed March 12, 2005; 
• You remained in the United States beyond March 12, 2005 without authorization from 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service; 
When these proceedings arise, the DHS is often represented by an assistant chief counsel from 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which is an agency of DHS (Legomsky, 2010, p. 
1641-1642). 
Although the DHS initiates hearings by serving the noncitizen with a NT A, the 
noncitizen has the option to present a defense by applying for asylum, withholding {a higher 
standard of asylum) and Convention Against Torture {CAT), which is a third form of relief for 
an individual in fear of persecution (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p.1 ). Additionally, 
an individual who is an affirmative asylum applicant and has lost before the Asylum Office can 
reapply for asylum, withholding and CAT (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. l ). In both 
scenarios, the DHS and the noncitizen are opposing parties who present an evidentiary hearing in 
front of an U (Legomsky, 2010, p. 1641). The noncitizen will experience two separate court 
dates in immigration court: first the Master Calendar hearing and then the Individual Hearing 
{Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. l ). 
II 
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Master Calendar Hearing 
When noncitizens attend court on Master Calendar Hearing dates, the U handles 
"administrative issues, including scheduling, filing applications, pleading to the immigration 
charges, and other issues that arise" (hnmigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 2). Within a span 
two hours, an IJ can hear between 20-30 cases (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 2). 
"Most Judges take cases where the respondents are represented by counsel first, and some Judges 
hear pro bono cases before cases with private attorneys (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, 
p. 2). 
Prior to or on the date of the Master Calendar Hearing, the noncitizen's attorney must 
submit a completed Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative Before the 
Immigration Court (Form EOIR-28), which officially states that they will be serving as 
representation for the noncitizen (Immigration Court Practice Manual, 2008, p. 57). At the 
beginning of the hearing, the U will ask the client if the attorney is in fact his/her attorney. If the 
noncitizen appears without counsel, the IJ typically asks if they would like a continuance so that 
they can seek legal counsel (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 3). "Although the 
respondent plays a minor role at the Master Calendar hearings, he must be present for all of them 
(unless the U explicitly waives his presence) or he will be ordered removed in absentia" 
(hnmigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 3). 
On the day of the Master Calendar Hearing, the attorney or client will be asked if they 
received the NTA that was issued from DHS (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 3). One 
of the main purposes of the Master Calendar Hearing is for the noncitizen, through counsel if 
they are represented, to either admit or deny the charges bought forth by the NTA (Immigration 
Equality Asylum Manual, p. 4). If all of the charges are correct, the attorney will likely admit to 
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them; however, if any of the infonnation is incorrect the attorney denies them and states the 
correct fact (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p.5). When the attorney admits to charges, 
they are also conceding removability on behalf of their client (Immigration Equality Asylum 
Manual, p.5). With that said, in order to apply for asylum, the noncitizen, with their attorney as 
their advocate, must admit removability under one of the grounds (Immigration Equality Asylum 
Manual, p.5). The judge then asks if the noncitizen wishes to designate a country for removal. At 
this time, the noncitizen's attorney will state that their client does not wish to do so since they 
will be applying for asylum/withholding/CAT, which require that the respondent never asks to 
return to his/her country under any circumstance (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p.5). 
However, the judge proceeds to identify the noncitizen's home country as the country of 
removal. 
After declining the opportunity to present his or her client's would-be country of 
removal, ''the attorney or the client will . . .  state for the record that the client wishes to apply for 
asylum [withholding or CAT] (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 6). If the asylum 
application has not already been filed, a submission date (generally a 30 to 45 day time period) is 
set by the judge by which the completed written asylum application must be submitted 
(Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 6). 
Individual Hearing 
"Merits hearings in asylum cases are fonnal, adversarial, evidentiary hearings on the 
record" (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 20). During these hearings, trial attorneys, 
functioning similarly to "prosecutors," work to combat the noncitizen's appeal for asylum 
(Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 20). These cases usually include the testimony of 
witnesses who are sworn in and subject to direct and cross-examination (Immigration Equality 
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Asylum Manual, p. 20). With that said, ''merits hearings in Immigration Court are comparable to 
administrative law proceedings in other federal or state agencies" (Immigration Equality Asylum 
Manual, p. 20). 
On the actual Individual Hearing date, it is not uncommon for most IJs to book more than 
one hearing for the same time slot because they believe that one of the cases will not actually be 
ready to present. This fills IJs calendars, making overbooking quite prevalent (Immigration 
Equality Asylum Manual, p. 19). 
Before the hearing begins, the IJ usually engages in a significant amount of conversation 
that is off-the-record, which includes summarizing the file, identifying exhibits, and addressing 
pre-exiting issues (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 21 ). Once the D goes on the record, 
the noncitizen's attorney has the opportunity to update or edit any of the information included on 
the asylum application or other materials (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 21 ). At this 
point, the attorney makes sure that the "names, addresses, dates, A-numbers, etc. are up-to-date 
and correct" (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 21 ). Once the asylum application and 
accompanying documents are current, the IJ will then proceed to commence the process of 
approving exhibits for admission (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 22). 
Once these steps are completed, some Us will permit the presentation of opening 
statements, which will summarize the noncitizen's case (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, 
p. 23). Then, similarly to most other courts, the noncitizen's attorney and Trial Attorney will 
summon witnesses and perform both direct examinations and cross-examinations (Immigration 
Equality Asylum Manual, p. 24). If there are expert witnesses that are unable to attend the 
hearing in-person due to their geographic location, most IJs will grant their testimony via 
telephone (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 24). After overseeing both direct and cross-
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examination, the D will then conduct their own intensive examination of witnesses, which can 
include inappropriate or offensive questions {Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 26). 
14 
Before reaching a decision, most Ds will give both sides that opportunity to present their 
closing arguments {Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 27). On the same day as the 
hearing, after closing arguments are heard, the D usually issues an oral decision {Immigration 
Equality Asylum Manual, p. 28). "Most often the IJ will read the {long) decision, summarizing 
the facts, reading boilerplate language about the legal standards for the relief sought, and finally 
analyzing the facts in light of the law" {Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 28). 
Once the D reaches their decision, both sides are given the opportunity to reserve or 
waive their right to appeal (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 28). If the IJ has decided to 
grant the noncitizen asylum, there is no reason for their attorney to secure their right to appeal 
(Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 29). In this instance, if ICE also forfeits their right to 
appeal, the decision is finalized (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 29). However, ifICE 
decides to reserve their right to appeal, it will take approximately 30 days for the noncitizen to 
find out if the ruling is upheld or not (Immigration Equality Asylum Manual, p. 29). Ultimately, 
" the IJ will give both attorneys a pre-printed order form which will either order removal, or state 
the form of relief granted, as well as whether or not appeal rights were reserved" {Immigration 
Equality Asylum Manual, p. 29). 
The Problems 
While the structure and process of immigration courts may appear to be practical and 
reasonable in theory, they have not necessarily succeeded in practice. Hundreds of thousands of 
cases such as those involving Vazquez, Perez, and Iraheta unfortunately languish in the system 
because of two major problems: immigration courts are severely underfunded, and that 
' 
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contributes to the scarcity of qualified Us. As a result, IJs are overworked and under a great deal 
of stress. These two major problems have specifically contributed to the recent "growing case 
backlog" that has plagued the country in regards to immigration hearings (Miller, Keith & 
Holmes, 2015, p. 53). 
Underfunded Immigration Courts 
While the number of cases pending in immigration courts has ballooned in recent years, 
the money they have to operate has remained fairly stagnant in comparison to the DHS's 
immigration enforcement sectors ("Empty Benches", 2015, p. 1). For example, as displayed in 
Figure 3, both Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) combined experienced a 105% monetary increase between FY 2003 and FY 
2015, which specifically went from $9.1 billion to approximately $18.7 billion ("Empty 
Benches", 2015, p. 1 ). On the other hand, immigration court monies increased "more modestly-
74 percent from FY 2003 to FY 2015, from $199 million to $347.2 million" ("Empty Benches'\ 
2015, p. 1). 
[Figure 3 here] 
Overall, the increase in funding within immigration enforcement sectors and the relative 
lack of money within immigration courts has significantly contributed to the increased backlog 
of cases. Indeed, the number of immigration court backlogs has spiked by 163% between FY 
2003 and April 201 5  ("Empty Benches", 2015, p. 1). ''The resulting backlog has led to average 
hearing delays of over a year and a half . . .  " ("Empty Benches", 2015, p. 1). Essentially, the 
number of cases being filed swpasses the actual number of cases that can sufficiently be heard 
by Us. "For instance in FY 2014, courts received 23 percent more matters than they completed 
(306,045 versus 248,078)" ("Empty Benches, 2015, p.3). 
-
II 
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Understaffed Immigration Courts 
Another major problem that heavily impacts immigration courts is the lack of qualified 
judges that are prepared to hear and make decisions on immigration cases. IJs determine "a large 
volume of cases, approximately three times the number of cases decided by a typical federal 
district judge" (Miller et al, 2015, p.53). According to Miller et. al (2015), in 2009, 250 IJs were 
responsible for hearing approximately 350,000 cases (an average of about 1,400 cases per judge 
per year). District court judges, on the other hand, were assigned about 400 cases each in that 
same year (Miller et al., 2015). In FY 2014, IJs received 306,045 matters to review, which 
included 225,896 removal cases (73.8% of the total number of matters), 60,446 requests for bond 
hearings (19.8%), and 19,703 motions (6.4%) ("Empty Benches", 2015, p. 2). 
As these statistics suggest, while the number of immigration cases have increased over 
the years, the number ofIJs available and qualified to hear such cases has decreased. "Attrition, 
budget cuts, and bum-out have led to a reduction in judges from 270 in April to 233 [in 2015], 
with only 212 judges serving full time . . .  " ("Empty Benches", 2015, p. 2). This steady decease 
in IJs, as Figure 4 indicates, has led to a tremendous spike in case backlog; since 2006, the 
number of cases has doubled-skyrocketing to 445,607 cases in April 2015 ("Empty Benches", 
2015, p.3). With this significant increase, as of April 2015, the average removal case remains 
pending for 604 days, which usually equates to nearly a year and eight months (Empty Benches, 
2015, p.3). 
[Figure 4 here] 
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The Impact of the Problems on Noncitizens and their Families 
In many cases, because immigration courts are underfunded and understaffed, noncitizen 
individuals and whole families are significantly impacted both emotionally and sometimes even 
physically. The biggest impact that the court backlog has on immigrants is the extensive amount 
of time that they spend in detention centers. "There are more than 180 immigration detention 
facilities in the United States, usually located far from major cities. Some house several thousand 
detainees at any one time, mixing aliens who have criminal records with others who don't'' 
(Myslinska, 2016, p. l ). In some cases, members of families are detained together in what are 
known as family detention facilities, but in others, they are separated and held in different 
detention centers. 
While the topic of immigrants being subjected to detention centers across the United 
States has long been controversial, the issue gained even more recognition in 2014 during the 
surge in child and family migration. The influx began in the spring of 2014 when thousands of 
unaccompanied children crossed the US-Mexico border into the U.S.; additionally, later that 
year, historically high numbers of Central American migrant families entered the states as well 
(Chishti and Hipsman, 2015, p.2). The number of people apprehended by the Border Patrol 
during that year was significantly higher than the previous year: 
In fiscal year (FY) 2014, the Border Patrol apprehended more than 69,000 
unaccompanied children and 68,000 family units, compared to 38,000 and 15,000, 
respectively, in FY 2013. Although public and press attention centered on 
unaccompanied children, the steepest increase was in mothers and young children 
(Chishti and Hipsman, 2015, p. 2). 
When these children and family units first arrived in the U.S., they were neither detained nor 
immediately deported; instead, they were typically released and issued an NTA, which included 
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a future court date that would occur one year or more from the notice issue date. However, it was 
quickly detennined that this policy encouraged the continued flow of children and families from 
both Mexico and Central America (Chishti and Hipsman, 2015, p. 3). Because of the lack of 
efficiency connected to the policy, "DHS rapidly expanded its family detention capacity from 
fewer than 100 beds in early 2014 to more than 3,000 as of September 2015" (Chishti and 
Hipsman, 2015, p.3). Initially, when the expansion of detention center beds occurred, the goal 
was to temporarily detain and speedily deport families, but many women and children have since 
applied for asylum and remained in detention facilities for elongated time periods as they wait 
for their claims to be processed (Chishti and Hipsman, 2015, p.3). 
Many children and immigrant proponents ''believe that [family detention centers are] 
morally deplorable and inherently psychologically harmful to young children and their parents" 
(Chishti and Hipsman, 2015, p.3). Advocates and lawmakers alike are also concerned that the 
detainees' physical needs are not being properly met-citing their lack of access to health care 
and susceptibility to unfair, abusive treatment as problematic (Chishti and Hipsman, 2015, p.3). 
While these conditions are prevalent within family detention centers, they can also be 
found within centers where individuals are held separately from other members of their families. 
Generally speaking, within detention centers "men and women are housed separately" 
(Myslinka, 2016, p. 1). Within some detention centers noncitizens, similarly to those in family 
detention centers, "experience [a] lack of medical care, physical violence, sexual abuse, 
unsanitary conditions, lack of water or food, segregation used as punishment, or being forced to 
sign documents" (Myslinka, 2016, p. 2). For example, recently Angel Rosa, an undocumented 
Guatemalan man, claimed that he contracted a gangrene infection of his groin while in a U.S. 
detention center (Feltz, 2016). In January 2016, Rosa was detained by ICE during a raid and held 
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in the Utah County jail {which has a contract with ICE to detain noncitizens) after his asylum 
claim was denied (Feltz, 2016). According to a paralegal, Mark Reid, who has helped work on 
Rosa's case, Rosa was detained in a cell with an overflowing toilet which held fecal matter 
(Feltz, 2016). Rosa's testicles quickly became infected with gangrene, which ultimately led to his 
rectum swelling shut and the infection of his intestines (Feltz, 2016). "His family says ICE failed 
to provide medical treatment until Rosa was rushed to an offsite hospital for emergency surgery. 
The ordeal nearly led to his castration, and ultimately left him sterile" (Feltz, 2016). Because of 
their insufficient medical capabilities, Rosa was released from ICE custody to live with his U.S. 
born daughter where he wore an ankle monitor and regularly attended meetings within an ICE's 
intensive supervision appearance program (Feltz, 2016). However, he was eventually re-detained 
and sent back to jail where he is fighting deportation (Feltz, 2016). 
Potential Solutions 
While there are currently serious problems (i.e. being underfunded and understaffed) with 
the way immigration courts are functioning, there are a few potential solutions that could address 
some issues. Because the aforementioned problems are so severe, any solution proposed to fix 
them must take three key principles into consideration. First, a realistic amount of funding must 
be allocated to immigration courts to ensure the "quality and quantity of adjudicators and their 
support staffs-especially law clerks and staff attorneys-as well as adequate physical 
resources" (Legomsky, 2010, p. 1677). Secondly, to prevent the politicization of IJs individuals 
who carry out adjudicatory tasks must obtain decisional independence (Legomsky, 2010, p. 
1677). Third, the solution must promote greater efficiencies, both fiscally and in terms of closing 
the time gap between the start of proceedings and their conclusions (Legomsky, 2010, p. 1677). 
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With that said, there are some solutions that are often proposed to fix these problems. 
The first potential solution is for Congress to deem immigration courts as Article I specialized 
courts, which will have their own trial and appellate divisions (Legomsky, 2010, p. 1682). 
Specialized courts and their judges can be defined as the following: 
. . .. courts that have limited and frequently exclusive jurisdiction in one or more specific 
fields of the law, for example, commercial courts, administrative courts, labor courts, and 
drug courts. Specialized courts are defined as tribunals of narrowly focused jurisdiction 
to which all cases that fall within that jurisdiction are routed. Judges who serve on a 
specialized court are considered specialists, even experts, in the fields of the law that fall 
within the court's jurisdiction (Zimmer, 2009, p. 1). 
If immigration courts became specialized courts with separate trial and appellate divisions, they 
would function more efficiently, saving the IJs, lawyers and noncitizens time and the courts 
themselves money. Essentially, the faster decisions are made, the less time detainees spend in 
detention centers. 
Another potential solution is to leave immigration courts as non-specialized courts within 
the DOJ, but "simply legislate greater job security for the immigration judges and BIA 
membersu (Legomsky, 2010, p. 1681). For example, the EIOR could transition into an 
independent tribunal within DOJ, similarly to the U.S. Parole Commission (Legomsky, 2010, p. 
1682). Congress could turn IJs and BIA members into AUs, which would improve both their 
pay and job security: 
The AU appointment process is freer of political influence, the AUs' grade levels and 
pay scales are set by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) rather than by political 
actors, and they cannot be removed from office except for good cause found after an 
evidentiary hearing before the Merit Systems Protection Board (Legomsky, 2010, p. 
1682). 
• 
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This option would help restore the Us independent decision making and increase the overall 
longevity of Us. 
21 
A further solution is to remove the EIOR from the Justice Department completely, 
making it an independent tribunal (Legomsky, 2010, p. 1683). Similarly to the first potential 
solution, the EOIR would host its own trial and appellate divisions, except they would be housed 
outside of the DOJ and all other departments (Legomsky, 2010, p. 1683). Also, like Article I 
special courts, an independent tribunal would be a part of the executive branch, perform solely 
adjudicatory functions and be independent from all government departments (Legomsky, 2010, 
p. 1683). 
Conclusion 
While we, as Americans, often think about the enforcement aspect of immigration (i.e. 
ICE or CBP), we often to fail to think about the impact that the judicial system has on the matter. 
Although there are various offices responsible for handling issues that pertain to the topic of 
immigration, the truth of the matter is that fundamental problems such as understaffing and 
underfunding are preventing immigration courts from adjudicating immigration cases in a 
deliberate yet efficient fashion. While Us are often financially, as well as emotionally, affected 
by their jobs, noncitizens face direct consequences from their problems as well. When cases are 
heavily backlogged, immigrants are more likely to spend more time in detention centers that are 
characterized by less than optimal conditions (i.e. poor medical treatment, overcrowding, lack of 
translators). However, the problems that currently exist within immigration courts can be fixed 
with potential solutions such as making immigration courts special courts, legislating more job 
security for Us and BIA members, and converting the EOIR into an independent tribunal 
separate from the DOJ. Regardless of the solution, a change needs to occur so that people like 
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Maximiano Vazquez-Guevarra, Ricardo Perez Luna, Mario Iraheta and Angel Rosa have a 
chance at a brighter future. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1 
Texas Immigration Court Statistics FY 2013 and FY 2014 
Number of Number of Cases Number of Cases 
Courts Judges in Each Cases Filed Adjudicated Cases Filed Adjudicated 
Court (FY 2013) (FY 2013) (FY 2014) (FY 2014) 
Dallas 6 5,846 7,716 8,136 8,1 1 8  
El Paso 2 3,364 2,479 2,862 2,593 
El Paso SPC 4 4,681 3,571 4,740 3,929 
Harlingen 2 9,366 2,494 10,614 2,614 
Houston 6 6,382 2,871 14,363 3,036 
Houston SPC 3 12,438 9,542 13,444 10,392 
Pearsall 4 7,949 4,783 8,280 5,403 
Port Isabell 3 7,190 4,069 9,827 6,456 
San Antonio 6 12,562 6,827 12,699 7,140 
Figure 1. Sources: The US Department of Justice EOIR FY 2014 Statistics Yearbook and EOIR Immigration Court Ustlngs 
ll ' 
I 
I I I_ 
I 
I � I 
I I 
I 
IMMIGRATION COURTS 
Figure 2 
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Figure 2. Source: https://www.Justice.gov/sites/default/flles/eoir/legacy/2013/11/0B/EOIR_Organization_Chart.pdf 
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Figure 3 
CBP & ICE Enforcement Funding vs. EOIR Court Funding, Case Backlog 
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Figure 3. Source: "Empty Benches: Underfunding of Immigration Courts Undermines Justice" American Immigration Council (20l5) 
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